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INTRODUCTION
In the final chapter of Justice, Sandel calls for a “new politics of the
common good,”1 which he presents as an alternative to John Rawls’s idea of
public reason. Sandel calls “misguided” Rawls’s search for “principles of
justice that are neutral among competing conceptions of the good life.”2
According to Sandel, “[i]t is not always possible to define our rights and duties
without taking up substantive moral questions; and even when it’s possible it
may not be desirable.”3 In taking up these moral questions, Sandel writes, we
must allow specifically religious convictions and reasons into the sphere of
public political debate.
With these arguments, Sandel joins a debate prompted in significant part by
Rawls’s 1993 work, Political Liberalism. In this paper I first criticize Sandel’s
characterization of Rawls’s views, then suggest two more particular questions
about the role of religion that Sandel’s “new politics” needs to address.
I.

RAWLS AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC REASON

The central premise of Rawls’s political liberalism is what he calls
“reasonable pluralism” – that free societies are necessarily divided by
By
“reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines.”4
“comprehensive” doctrines, Rawls means those that “include conceptions of
what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much
else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.”5
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Professor of Law and of Philosophy, Boston University.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 263 (2009).
Id. at 220.
Id.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xvii (expanded ed. 2005).
Id. at 13.
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Religious conceptions are not the only examples of comprehensive doctrines,
but they are particularly clear ones.6
Rawls responds to reasonable pluralism by seeking what he calls a
“freestanding” political conception: that is, a conception of justice that doesn’t
depend upon any particular comprehensive doctrine.7 In Rawls’s metaphor,
this freestanding political conception can fit like a “module” into the
comprehensive doctrine of each citizen.8 In this way, Rawls argues, we can
perhaps attain an “overlapping consensus” over a political conception of
justice despite enduring and reasonable disagreement over comprehensive
views.9
In Political Liberalism, Rawls introduced the idea of “public reason” as a
society’s rules for organizing and regulating its public political debate.10 He
emphasized the constraints that public reason places on the kinds of arguments
that may be offered in public debate.11 With regard to “constitutional
essentials” and “matters of basic justice,”12 Rawls maintained in Political
Liberalism that “political values alone” are to be invoked – that is, values from
a freestanding political conception and not a comprehensive doctrine.13 These
“limits of public reason” apply to “citizens when they engage in political
advocacy in the public forum,” or to citizens when they vote on fundamental
matters.14 They apply, further, to candidates, to “political parties,” and to any

6

See, e.g., id. at 205, 224-25, 311. As specific examples of non-religious comprehensive
doctrines, Rawls mentions utilitarianism and the “reasonable liberalism[] of Kant.” Id. at
37; see also id. at 13, 135, 170-71.
7 Id. at xxx, 10, 12, 144.
8 E.g., id. at 12.
9 For Rawls’s account of an “overlapping consensus,” see id. at 133-72.
10 Id. at 213 (“Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its
citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship.”).
11 See id. at 213-22. Public reason also has a positive side. Rawls refers, for example, to
the facilitative “guidelines and rules” of “public inquiry.” Id. at 162.
12 Rawls defines these as (1) principles specifying “the general structure of government
and the political process,” including the various legislative, executive, and judicial powers,
together with “the scope of majority rule”; and (2) “equal basic rights and liberties of
citizenship,” e.g., “the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience,
freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.” Id. at
227. From these Rawls distinguishes other “political questions” – which may be “most”
political questions – e.g., “much [of] tax legislation and many laws regulating property,”
environmental protection laws, and provisions for “museums and the arts.” Id. at 214; see
also id. at 244-45 (mentioning problems, arguably fundamental, that he has not addressed:
duties to future generations, international law questions, health care, protection of animals
and nature).
13 Id. at 214. In non-fundamental matters, the limits of public reason do not necessarily
apply. See, e.g., id. at 244-46.
14 Id. at 215.
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“other groups who support” candidates.15 Of course the limits of public reason
apply also to officials in their conduct of public business.
That was the conception Rawls presented in the original 1993 edition of
Political Liberalism. And that is the conception Sandel now attributes to
Rawls. As Sandel presents Rawls’s views: “In debating justice and rights, we
should set aside our personal moral and religious convictions and argue from
the standpoint of a ‘political conception of the person,’ independent of any
particular loyalties, attachments, or conception of the good life.”16 And
further: “Not only may government not endorse a particular conception of the
good; citizens may not even introduce their moral and religious convictions
into public debate about justice and rights.”17
The main problem with Sandel’s characterization is that four years after
Political Liberalism, Rawls changed his account of public reason, amending it
to make public political discussion much more open to comprehensive
doctrines, including specifically religious reasons.18 In his 1997 essay, The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited,19 reprinted in the later editions of Political
Liberalism, Rawls introduced his famous “proviso”:
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be
introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due
course proper political reasons – and not reasons given solely by
comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient to support
whatever the comprehensive doctrines are said to support.20
One might well think this proviso insufficiently inclusive of religious reasons
and religious citizens. But even so, a characterization of Rawls’s views on
public reason should acknowledge the proviso and the shift it marks from
Rawls’s earlier views in Political Liberalism. I think that is true even of a
book, like Sandel’s Justice, that addresses a wider, generally educated
audience and not just Rawls specialists. The differences between Rawls’s and
Sandel’s views, while significant, are less than Sandel’s presentation would
suggest.
Sandel is of course aware of Rawls’s proviso; indeed his ongoing
conversations with Rawls between the original publication of Political
Liberalism and The Idea of Public Reason Revisited likely were one important

15 Id. They do not apply either to personal deliberation about politics or to political
discussion within voluntary associations.
16 SANDEL, supra note 1, at 248.
17 Id.
18 Sandel’s characterization also omits important details of Rawls’s views in Political
Liberalism. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 247-52 (describing circumstances in which
comprehensive views might be introduced as a sort of repair work in a society that is sharply
divided).
19 John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
20 RAWLS, supra note 4, at 462.
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reason Rawls modified his views.21 My point is simply that the reader of
Sandel’s book should be apprised of Rawls’s final position on the subject.
II.

OPEN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE “POLITICS OF THE COMMON GOOD”

Sandel acknowledges that his idea of a new “kind of political discourse” is
not yet “fully worked out.”22 I want to suggest a few questions he should
address about the inclusion of religious reasons in that political discourse.
One question is whether public officials should be subject to obligations
more stringent than those that apply to private citizens. Sandel doesn’t reject
this position definitively, but he doesn’t endorse it either. As the exemplar of
the liberal neutrality he criticizes, Sandel selects President Kennedy’s 1960
speech that declared his Catholic faith a purely private matter. That faith,
Kennedy assured the public, “would have no bearing on his public
responsibilities.”23 Kennedy’s speech, Sandel writes critically, “reflected a
public philosophy,” exemplified in Rawls’s 1971 Theory of Justice, “that
government should be neutral on moral and religious questions” so as to allow
each individual the freedom to choose “his or her own conception of the good
life.”24 Although Sandel also acknowledges what he calls a “legitimate worry”
about an “entanglement” of politics in “moral and religious disputes,” he
doesn’t clearly indicate a difference between public officials’ obligations and
those of ordinary citizens with respect to religion’s role in politics.25
As Sandel of course knows, the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, with its prohibition on “an establishment of religion,” limits the
degree and kind of “entanglement” between politics and religion.26 I don’t
read Sandel’s sketch of his morally committed politics, with his praise for

21 See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776-94
(1994) (book review) (discussing Rawls’s proviso).
22 SANDEL, supra note 1, at 261.
23 Id. at 244.
24 Id. at 246.
25 Id.
26 Sandel’s use of the word “entanglement” may be a reference to the Lemon test, which
the Supreme Court often has applied (or at least invoked) in Establishment Clause cases.
Under the original formulation of the test, a challenged governmental action will be
invalidated unless it satisfies each of the following criteria: (1) it must have a secular
purpose; (2) its “primary effect” must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must
not create an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Court’s decision in Agostini v. Felton revised the test,
treating entanglement not as a separate inquiry but as one of three factors to be considered in
determining unconstitutional effect. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).
Although Lemon hasn’t formally been overruled, in recent years the Court often has
employed instead the “endorsement” test, abandoning reference to forbidden
“entanglement.” See id. at 235.
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then-candidate Obama’s invocation of religion, to threaten action inconsistent
with the Constitution.27
But aside from the question whether Sandel’s proposals violate the
Constitution as judicially interpreted and enforced, one might ask also whether
he shouldn’t acknowledge an obligation of officials, and perhaps candidates as
well, to speak in a secular language when they seek to justify their policy
proposals or carry out governmental decisions. The great German philosopher
Jürgen Habermas makes just this claim, even as he rejects as too restrictive
Rawls’s rules (proviso included) for ordinary citizens in public debate.
Habermas writes that the liberal state must expect citizens “to recognize the
principle that exercise of political authority must be neutral toward competing
worldviews. Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons
count beyond the institutional threshold separating the informal public sphere
from parliaments, courts, ministries, and administrations.”28
As formulated, Habermas’s “institutional translation proviso,” as he calls it,
distinguishes between religious and secular comprehensive views: only
religious reasons must be screened out in the sphere of policy formulation and
decision. While Habermas has left some questions unanswered – for example,
whether his proviso would require exclusively secular reasons of candidates as
well as of officials – the line he draws for officials seems to me appropriate for
a pluralist democratic society. Sandel doesn’t endorse such a principle, but as I
read his text he has left the matter open.
Habermas’s institutional translation proviso would seem attractive to Sandel
in its application to ordinary citizens. Habermas notes the asymmetry of the
burden that Rawls’s proviso imposes: “[Rawls’s] translation proviso for
religious reasons and the institutional precedence of secular over religious
reasons demand that religious citizens make an effort to learn and adapt that

27 Sandel praises then-candidate Obama for understanding and speaking to “the moral
and spiritual yearning” in America. Obama is right, Sandel says, to counsel progressives
not to “abandon the field of religious discourse.” SANDEL, supra note 1, at 250 (quoting
Barack Obama, Keynote Address at Call to Renewal Conference (June 28, 2006)
[hereinafter Obama, Call to Renewal], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/
politics/2006obamaspeech. html). Sandel further cites approvingly Obama’s 2006 criticism
of a 2004 campaign remark about the role of religion in politics; in 2004 he had maintained
that because he was running to be senator and not minister, he shouldn’t impose his own
religious views. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 245 (citing supra, Obama, Call to Renewal). Two
years later, Obama called his previous remark “the typically liberal response” and said that
progressives should not “forfeit the imagery and terminology through which millions of
Americans understand both their personal morality and social justice.” Id. Obama went on
to note that great American reformers of the past “were not only motivated by faith, but
repeatedly used religious language to argue for their cause.” Id. at 246 (quoting supra,
Obama, Call to Renewal).
28 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the
“Public Use of Reason” by Religious and Secular Citizens, in BETWEEN NATURALISM AND
RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 114, 130 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2008).
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secular citizens are spared.”29 Habermas would make the burdens on citizens
more equal. He rejects, as inconsistent with democratic citizenship in
contemporary liberal societies, a “laicist” attitude that would see “religious
traditions and religious communities” as “archaic relics of premodern societies
persisting into the present.”30 Instead, Habermas claims that non-religious
persons, in their capacity as participants in political discussion, must
acknowledge that there may be “cognitive substance” in religious claims31 and
that religious positions may be susceptible of truth.32 While the institutional
translation proviso holds that only secular reasons may count in the
governmental sphere of parliaments, courts, and administrations, Habermas
argues that secular citizens must “participate in efforts to translate relevant
contributions from the religious language into a publicly accessible
language.”33 This obligation to cooperate in translation seems compatible with
Sandel’s suggestion that citizens have an obligation to “attend to [their fellows’
moral and religious convictions] more directly – sometimes by challenging and
contesting them, sometimes by listening to and learning from them.”34
Perhaps less congenial to Sandel, but an alternative and in my view
attractive way to conceive of the relation between secular and religious
citizens, is the “accountability proviso” suggested by Cristina Lafont.35 She
would ease the burden Rawls imposes on religious citizens, requiring neither
that they frame their contributions to public political discourse in secular terms
nor that they offer secular translations.36 But she criticizes Habermas’s
requirement that secular citizens, in their capacity as participants in public

29

Id. at 136.
Id. at 138-39. Habermas suggests that this unequal burden violates the neutrality
principle of the liberal state. This claim doesn’t seem obvious to me. Habermas elsewhere
invokes Rawls’s distinction between neutrality of aim and the impossible neutrality of
effect. See HABERMAS, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern
Liberalism, in BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, supra note
28, at 271, 282-83. Habermas needs to argue that the unequal burden on religious citizens is
non-neutral in aim, not just in effect.
31 HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere, supra note 28, at 139 (“[T]he admission of
religious assertions into the political arena only makes sense if all citizens can be reasonably
expected not to exclude the possibility that these contributions may have cognitive
substance – while at the same time respecting the priority of secular reasons and the
institutional translation proviso.”); see also id. at 142.
32 Id. at 131.
33 HABERMAS, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism,
supra note 30, at 310; see also HABERMAS, Religion in the Public Sphere, supra note 28, at
131-32.
34 SANDEL, supra note 1, at 268.
35 Cristina Lafont, Religion and the Public Sphere: What Are the Deliberative
Obligations of Democratic Citizenship?, 35 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 127, 132 (2009).
36 Id. at 129-32 (offering her “more attractive” theory of mutual accountability in
contrast to Rawls’s proviso).
30
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political discussion, acknowledge the possible truth of religious beliefs.37
Religious and secular citizens, Lafont argues, should be free to take any
“cognitive stance” that they choose.38 But in accordance with the “priority of
public reasons in determining coercive policies,” she maintains, all citizens
have the obligation to answer objections framed in public reasons with replies
framed in public reasons.39 As Lafont puts her accountability proviso:
Whenever citizens manage to cast their objections to a proposed policy in
terms of reasons generally acceptable to democratic citizens (i.e. reasons
based on basic democratic principles of freedom and equality, etc.), other
citizens have the obligation to address and to defeat them with compelling
reasons before such a coercive policy can be legitimately enforced.40
What I am trying to suggest with this discussion of Habermas’s and Lafont’s
revisions of the Rawlsian proviso is that there are a variety of positions
consistent with Sandel’s general descriptions of the “politics of the common
good.” Habermas, Lafont, and even Rawls believe that religious citizens may
present religious arguments in the first instance, even as to fundamental
political matters (“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice,” in
Rawls’s formulation). The interesting differences concern the further
obligations placed on either religious or secular citizens. Sandel’s general
“politics of the common good” might develop with attention to these recently
presented alternatives – whether critical or favorable – as well as to the
question whether public officials or candidates face more stringent restrictions
on religious convictions than do ordinary citizens.

37

See id. at 150.
Id. at 141.
39 Id. at 141-42.
40 Id. at 142. Lafont makes clear that the reasons offered in reply must be “reasons
generally acceptable to all democratic citizens,” that is, Rawlsian public reasons. Id. at 143.
38

